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The Proposed Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: What Hath the
ABA Wrought?
FOREST . BOWMAN*
After barely a decade under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the American legal profession has been presented with a proposed new
ethical Code. Since the decade of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility included the Watergate scandal, the opening up of the legal pro-
fession to advertising, the beginnings of one-on-one solicitation and
attacks against the profession from all quarters of our society, including
the President of the United States, it behooves us to look carefully at
any proposal which seeks to improve lawyers' ethics.
The proposed new Code is the product of four years of effort by the
ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, chaired
by Robert . Kutak of Omaha, Nebraska. It is at once a sharp depar-
ture from the form and content of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, a frank and realistic reappraisal of many once prohibited
practices in light of modem developments in the practice of law, and a
tepid re-hash of conservative lawyer doctrine reaching back beyond
even the ABA's 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics.
The new Code does not answer all of the questions (or, indeed, ASK
all of the right questions) concerning lawyers' ethics in the 1980's. Its
effect will not be to usher in the millennium where every lawyer will be
ethical and the legal profession respected and beloved throughout the
* Mr. Bowman is an Associate Professor of Law at West Virginia University.
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land. But, then, no one said it would. And the question is not whether
the proposed "Model Rules of Professional Conduct" will "do it all,"
but whether the new Code is a desirable improvement on the present
Code or no improvement at all. On careful reading, it appears to be a
bit of both.
HISTORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICAL CODES IN AMERICA
While the American legal profession can trace its beginnings to the
mid-17th Century,' the use of written codes of legal ethics can be traced
only as far back as 1887- or perhaps to 1835, if we stretch the point.2
Various reasons have been advanced for the absence of formal codes of
ethics for lawyers in the early days of this country, but the most persua-
sive reason is that the practice of law, like most professional endeavors
in early America, was relatively uncomplicated and the lawyer's ethical
obligations and responsibilities were clearly understood by the mem-
bers of the profession. Moreover, this being a largely rural country,
lawyers in any locality were generally well known to one another and
the collective opinion of the local bar could be called upon to bring
pressure on an individual lawyer who overstepped the bounds of ethi-
cal behavior. Hence, there simply was no need for a formal code of
conduct for lawyers?
As the nation grew so did the number of lawyers and along with
them a corresponding growth in the variety and complexity of their
practice. The line between ethical and unethical conduct became in-
creasingly vague. And with the increase in the size of the bar which
accompanied the growth of large cities, the collective opinion of the
local bar became meaningless because one lawyer could hardly know
more than a small percentage of the total membership of any particular
bar.4
DAVID HOFFMAN'S "RESOLUTIONS"
In 1835, perhaps distressed by what he had seen of the ethical behav-
ior of his fellow lawyers, David Hoffman, a member of the Baltimore
Bar, wrote "Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment."5
1. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 135-142 (1953).
2. Cady, Canons to the Code ofProfessionalResponsibilitr, 2 CONN. L. REV. 222, 248 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Cady].
3. Armstrong, Code of Professional Responsibili y in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Armstrong].
4. It is perhaps only coincidence, but it was during the time when the need for a written
code of ethics was first being felt-roughly the time between the "log cabin and the hard cider"
campaign of 1840 and the nation's centennial--that lawyers fell into greatest disfavor. Pound,
supra note I, at 223-242.
5. H. DRINKER, LEoAL ETHIcs 338 (1953) [hereinafter cited as DRINKER].
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Hoffman's resolutions, which were drafted for the assistance of a
younger member of the Baltimore Bar, were broad-based and lacking
in any organization, but they ring out from that bleak time with a maj-
esty of language and a certainty of purpose that one searches for in
vain in committee-drafted documents.
For example, of switching sides in a case, he wrote,
If I have ever had any connection with a cause, I will never permit
myself (when that connection is for any reason severed) to be en-
gaged on the side of my former antagonist. Nor shall any change in
the formal aspect of the cause induce me to regard it as a ground of
exception. It is a poor apologyfor being found on the opposite side,
that the present is but the ghost of the former cause.6
As to who is to be in charge of the case, Hoffman left no doubt:
"Should my client be disposed to insist on captious requisitions, or friv-
olous and vexatious defenses, they shall neither be enforced nor coun-
tenanced by me."7 Whatever his faults, Hoffman knew where he stood
on ethical matters and he stated his positions bluntly and, it must be
added, eloquently.
But Hoffman also evidenced a reluctance to zealously represent a
client "charged with crimes of the deepest dye" when the evidence left
"no just doubt of their guilt"8 and said that he would never plead the
statute of limitations "when based on the mere efflux of time," declar-
ing that if his client had "no other defense than the legal bar, he shall
never make me a partner in his knavery."9 He felt similarly about the
"bar of infancy against an honest demand." 10
In Hoffman's resolutions are found the beginnings of many of the
most sacrosanct of today's ethical principles: courtesy toward other
lawyers;"' taking cases for those who cannot pay;' keeping clients'
funds separate from counsel's monies;' 3 reasonable fees; 14 lawyer not
appearing as a witness in a cause in which he is also counsel;1 5 duty not
to mislead the court; 6 courtesy toward witnesses;' 7 and no contact with
opposing party except through his counsel."8 That Hoffman meant for
6. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 339.
7. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 339.
8. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 340.
9. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 340.
10. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 340.
11. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 338.
12. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 342.
13. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 344.
14. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 344.
15. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 346.
16. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 348.
17. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 349.
18. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 349.
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his resolutions to be a guide for the practicing lawyer is reflected in the
last resolution: "I will read the foregoing forty-nine resolutions twice
every year during my professional life."'19 But Hoffman's resolutions
received little notice in his time and are of interest today only because
of their influence on the development of later ethical codes.
Then, in 1854, Judge George Sharswood of Philadelphia, at that time
a member of the District Court of the City and County of Philadelphia,
and Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania and later a
Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, published a series of
lectures he had delivered before the Law Class of the University of
Pennsylvania under the title "A Compend of Lectures on the Aims and
Duties of the Profession of Law," a title which was later, mercifully,
shortened to "An Essay on Professional Ethics."20 Judge Sharswood's
essay, which dealt with the duties of the lawyer in his relation to the
public, the court, the profession, and the client, was widely dissemi-
nated and sparked a lively debate within the profession.
Written for oral delivery, the essay is difficult reading today. But the
judge's position is clear. "There is," he wrote, "perhaps no profession
after that of the sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more
imperatively necessary than that of the law."'2 1 And this one point-
"high-toned morality"--- is relied upon throughout the essay as a bea-
con in the night.
Like'David Hoffman, Judge Sharswood insisted that lawyers regard
the courts with respect, though Sharswood's viewpoint was, under-
standably, that of a judge.22 In his essay Judge Sharswood cautioned
against exparte dealings with the court;2 unnecessary communications
with jurors;24 misleading the court;25 misleading opposing counsel;26
and attaining the "reputation of a sharp practitioner." 27 He en-
couraged lawyers to develop and maintain good relations with their
19. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 351.
20. Armstrong, supra note 3, at 2.
21. G. S1IARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 55 (1896) [hereinafter cited as
SHARSWOOD].
22. "Counsel should bear in mind also the wearisomeness of a judge's office, how much he
sees and hears in the course of a long session, to try his temper and patience." SHARSWOOD, supra
note 21, at 63. It is interesting to compare this viewpoint with Hoffman's fourth resolution wich
presumes intemperate conduct from the bench:
Should judges, while on the bench, forget that, as an officer of their court, I have rights,
and treat me even with disrespect, I shall value myself too highly to deal with them in
like manner. A firm and temperate remonstrance is all that I will ever allow myself.
DRINKER, supra note 5, at 351.
23. SHtARswooD, supra note 21, at 66.
24. SHARswooD, supra note 21, at 67.
25. SIARSWOOD, supra note 21, at 72.
26. SHAP.swoOD, supra note 21, at 73.
27. SHARswooD, supra note 21, at 74.
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fellow lawyers;2" to be diligent and zealous in representing clients;29
and to take cases regardless of the offense or the accused or the nature
of the cause.3" On this last subject Judge Sharswood's position is con-
siderably more liberal than David Hoffman's. Of civil cases Judge
Sharswood wrote: "A defendant has a legal right to require that the
plaintiff's demand against him should be proved and proceeded with
according to law."'" In fairness to Hoffman, however, it must be noted
that Judge Sharswood was as reluctant as Mr. Hoffman to condone a
lawyer's pleading of technicalities to defeat "what he believes to be an
honest and just claim, by insisting upon the slips of the opposite party,
by sharp practice, or special pleading ... ."32
Judge Sharswood also urged counsel to exercise the utmost candor in
dealing with clients;33 to represent the poor for no fees;34 and to estab-
lish fair fees.35 But the Judge was merciless in his condemnation of the
contingent fee:
It is to be observed, then, that such a contract changes entirely the
relation of counsel to the cause. It reduces him from his high posi-
tion of an officer of the court and a minister of justice, to that of a
party litigating his own claim. Having now a deep personal interest
in the event of the controversy, he will cease to consider himself sub-
ject to the ordinary rules of professional conduct. He is tempted to
make success, at all hazards and by all means, the sole end of his
exertions. He becomes blind to the merits of the case, and would find
it difficult to persuade himself, no matter what state of facts might be
developed in the progress of the proceedings, as to the true character
of the transaction, that it was his duty to retire from it. . .The worse
consequence is yet to be told,-- its effect upon professional character.
It turns lawyers into higglers with their clients.3 6
By contrast, Hoffman's 24th Resolution had expressly approved of
contingent fees as a sort of poor man's key to the courthouse,. "They
are," he wrote, "sometimes perfectly proper and are called for by pub-
lic policy, no less than by humanity. '37
THE ALABAMA CODE
Judge Sharswood's essay went through four editions in the Judge's
28. SHtASWOOD, supra note 21, at 75.
29. SHAswooD, supra note 21, at 76.
30. SHARSWOOD, supra note 21, at 90.
31. SHASWOOD, supra note 21, at 95.
32. SHARSWOOD, supra note 21, at 99.
33. SHARSWOOD, supra note 21, at 107.
34. SHARSWOOD, supra note 21, at 51.
35. SHARSWOOD, supra note 21, at 51.
36. SHARSWOOD, supra note 21, at 60.
37. DRn KE, supra note 5, at 343.
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lifetime and a fifth, thirteen years after his death.38 As a result of the
enthusiastic debate that the essay engendered, a number of states
adopted canons or codes of professional ethics to govern the conduct of
lawyers. The first of these was Alabama, in 1887. Fittingly, the first
paragraph of the second section of Judge Sharswood's essay is quoted
immediately following the preamble of the Alabama Code. It is cited
simply: "Sharswood," evidence that Judge Sharswood's essay was fa-
miliar to all lawyers.39
The Alabama Code of Ethics was written by Thomas Goode Jones,
an outstanding lawyer who was to serve as Speaker of the Alabama
House of Representatives, Governor of Alabama, Member of the Ala-
bama Constitutional Convention of 1901, and U.S. District Judge for
the Middle and Northern Districts of Alabama.40 Judge Jones had
urged the adoption of a code of legal ethics at the annual meeting of
the Alabama State Bar Association in 1881, insisting that "[n]othing
would more effectually promote the ends of justice, or tend more to
advance judicial administration." Predictably, he was named to chair a
committee directed to report a code of ethics to the next meeting of the
association.41
It was 1887 before the Judge was ready with the final draft of his
Code, written he said, without model or guide, though he did admit
that he had read Judge Sharswood's "Essay on Professional Ethics."
There were fifty-six sections in his Code and all but four were adopted
without objection or discussion by the Alabama State Bar Association.
These remaining four, however, provide an interesting foretaste of fu-
ture debates on the purpose and scope of ethical codes.
First, there was spirited objection to a canon which directed lawyers
to avoid unusual hospitality toward judges, the objection being that
there was no necessity for the rule and that the object of a code of ethics
should be "to condemn practices which have prevailed. . . and [thus]
to set the seal of condemnation of the association upon certain conduct
38. SHARSWOOD, MEMORIAL TO AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS V (1896).
39. High Moral Principle Only Safe Guide 'There is, perhaps, no profession after that of
the sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary than
that of the law. There is certainly, without any exception, no profession in which so
many temptations beset the path to swerve from the lines of strict integrity; in which so
many delicate and difficult questions of duty are constantly arising. There are pitfalls
and man-traps at every step, and the mere youth, at the very outset of his career needs
often the prudence and self-denial as well as the moral courage, which belongs com-
monly to riper years. High moral principle is his only safe guide; the only torch to light
his way amidst darkness and obstruction.'
DRINKER, supra note 5, at 352.
40. Jones, First Legal Code of Ethics Adopted in the United States, 8 A.B.A.J. 111 (1922)
[hereinafter cited as Jones].
41. Jones, supra note 40, at I11.
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which has been practiced to the detriment of the profession. 42
But Jones and others met the objection head-on. This was, they said,
a good rule of conduct and the main purpose of a code of ethics for
lawyers was to call such basic rules of conduct to the attention of
younger lawyers, and not merely to condemn established practices.
The rule was adopted as read and the principle established that a major
purpose of a code of ethics was to serve as a guide to proper ethical
conduct.43
When the canon titled "Candor & Fairness Should Characterize At-
torney" was read, a motion was made to strike the language which con-
demned "offering evidence which it is known the court must reject as
illegal, to get it before the jury, under the guise of arguing its admissi-
bility." Those arguing for the motion to strike this language were con-
cerned that it would render unethical any attempts to get questionable
trial court rulings on evidence before the Supreme Court for review.
The motion was rejected and the rule adopted as presented after it
was pointed out that this canon did not condemn a lawyer who makes a
bona fide offer of evidence to raise a question of law which the lawyer
believes arises in a case. Thus, a second important point was made
regarding this Code of Ethics: the Code seeks not to interfere with an
ethical lawyer in the proper representation of a client, but to deal with
those unethical lawyers who are trying, as Judge Jones put it, "to drive
around the law."44
When Canon 14 of the proposed Code was read, there was strong
objection. The canon read:
An attorney may decline in a civil cause to conduct a prosecution,
when satisfied that the purpose is merely to harass or injure the op-
posite party, or to work oppression or wrong; but once entering the
cause he is bound to avail himself of all lawful advantages in favor of
his client, and cannot without the consent of the client afterwards
abandon the cause.45
The convention substituted must for may in the first sentence and
struck other language regarding zealous representation of the client. At
first reading it would appear that the Alabama Bar could not go along
with Judge Jones' frank statement of a lawyer's duty to, once in a
cause, do all that he can for his client within the bounds of the law. But
Canon 10, which the convention had already adopted without objec-
tion, contained the same concept, albeit in somewhat less persuasive
42. Jones, supra note 40, at 112.
43. Jones, supra note 40, at 112.
44. Jones, supra note 40, at 112.
45. Jones, supra note 40, at 113.
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language. There, quoting freely from Judge Sharswood's essay,46 Jones
had written:
An attorney 'owes entire devotion to the cause of his client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his cause, and the exertion of
the utmost skill and ability,' to the end, that nothing may be taken or
withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No sac-
rifice or peril, even to loss of life itself, can absolve from the fearless
discharge of this duty.47
So the convention was already on record in support of zealous repre-
sentation of a client and the stricken language from Canon 14 did not
temper that duty. One could argue however that the precise wording
and the placement of the "zealous representation" language in the
stricken part of Canon 14 were in many respects stronger than that in
Canon 10.48
In the end the convention rejected only one of Judge Jones' propos-
als-proposed Canon 20, which read: "An attorney should not conduct
his own cause." While noting that this rule was undoubtedly founded
on the ancient maxim that a man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a
client, Alex. T. London, a lawyer from Birmingham, moved to strike
the rule, saying: "It is one of the great American privileges to make a
fool of yourself, and it is guaranteed by the Constitution (sic) and I
don't see anything wrong in it-anything immoral in it."149 Following
Mr. London's no-nonsense argument the motion to strike was carried
and the American lawyer's right to make a fool of himself was
preserved.
The Alabama Code of Ethics was adopted, with slight modification,
in ten other states between 1887 and 1906.50 Then the drive for a code
of ethics for lawyers went national. In 1905 George R. Peck, President
of the American Bar Association, appointed a committee to report on
the advisability of the ABA adopting a code of ethics. This committee
reported at the annual meeting of the Association in 1906 that the
46. SHARSWOOD, supra note 21, at 78.
47. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 355.
48. It is worth noting that ABA Canon 30, the equivalent of Alabama Rule 14, adds these
two sentences, the first a virtual restatement of Jones' original Rule 14:
But otherwise it is his right, and having accepted the retainer, it becomes his duty to
insist upon a judgement of the Court as to the legal merits of his client's claim. His
appearance in Court should be deemed equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in
his opinion his client's case is one proper for judicial determination.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESIONAL Emics No. 30. The ABA language is stronger than the Alabama
Code but not nearly so strong as Jones' original language in Rule 14. DRINKER, supra note 5, at
356.
49. Jones, supra note 40, at 113.
50. Georgia, Virginia, Michigan, Colorado, North Carolina, Wisconsin, West Virginia, Ma-
ryland, Kentucky and Missouri. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 23.
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adoption of such a code was both advisable and practicable. 5 1
In 1908 the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics of the ABA
(of which Judge Jones was a member) submitted a draft for canons of
ethics to a meeting of the Association held in Seattle. The committee's
report stated: "The foundation of the draft for canons of ethics, here-
with submitted, is the code adopted by the Alabama State Bar Associa-
tion in 1887 . ",52
The ABA Code was, however, more precise and all-inclusive than
any of the state codes that preceded it. It was shorter,53 omitting many
rules commonly included in the eleven state codes, such as, the sugges-
tion that legal work be done for the family of a deceased lawyer at no
fee,54 advice to a trial lawyer to avoid concealing strong points of a case
until the closing argument because the court and jury will think the
lawyer has a weak case,"5 and the admonition to be prompt and punc-
tual in answering letters and keeping engagements strengthen a law-
yer's hold on clients. 6 One commentator on the new Code, noting that
it made "no such appeals to motives of expediency and self-advan-
tage," declared that the new ABA Code "occupies a higher plane. Its
canons are left to rest on principles of right and honor."57
The ABA Code contained one canon of considerable significance
which was not found in any of the state codes, except for Kentucky's
Canon 2, which declared it to be the duty of the bar "to endeavor to
prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness in the
selections of Judges" and to "protest earnestly and actively against the
51. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 24.
52. Jones, supra note 40, at 113.
53. The original ABA Code contained only 32 canons. It was expanded three times, in 1928
with the additions of Canons 33 thru 45; in 1933 with the addition of Canon 46; and in 1937 with
the adoption of Canon 47. The canons in their final form (i.e., 47 canons) have been broken down
into eight broad categories by one writer
(1) General Attorney---court relationships--Canons 1-5;
(2) General Attorney--client relationships--Canons 6-8, 15, 16, 19, 37;
(3) Relations with other parties, essentially in a courtroom context-Canons 9, 17, 18,
39;
(4) Standards of Conduct during a trial-Canons 20-26;
(5) Elementary Fiduciary principles-Canons 11 and 38;
(6) Details as to fees and expenses-Canons 12-14, and 42;
(7) The highly sensitive areas of associates, intermediaries, specialization and the
like-Canons 27, 33-35, 43, and 45-47;
(8) A number of generalized statements of professional principles-Canons 10-32, 40,
44.
Swindler, Toward a Restatement of Professional Ethics, 27 U. PrrT. L. REv. 795, 796 nn.2-12
(1966).
54. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 362 (Alabama Code, Canon 52).
55. Baldwin, The New American Code of LegalEthics, 8 COLUM. L. Rav. 541 (1908) [herein-
after cited as Baldwin].
56. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 359 (Alabama Code, Canon 33).
57. Baldwin, supra note 55, at 542.
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appointment or election of those who are unsuitable for the Bench." '5 8
Only one canon, number 13 dealing with contingent fees, was sub-
stantially amended from the form it took in the committee report. That
amendment was one of form more than substance in order to make it
plain that contracts for contingent fees were proper where sanctioned
by law, provided the terms were reasonable.59
The right of a lawyer to decline employment, a matter not clearly
expressed in any of the state codes, was settled by Canon 31 which read
in part: "No lawyer is obliged to act either as advisor or advocate for
every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to
decline employment. 6 °
So Thomas Goode Jones' creation, itself Judge Sharswood's essay in
many respects, became the ethical guide of the American legal profes-
sion. And if this Code was not perfect it was in the words of one writer,
"a fair general statement of the main duties of members of the legal
profession. ' 61 Unfortunately, the ABA stopped short of making the
new Code anything more. Mr. Justice David J. Brewer of the United
States Supreme Court, a member of the committee which drafted the
Code, had suggested that a set of rules be drafted to give the new Code
binding force by legislation or, where permitted, action of the highest
courts of the states. The committee rejected Justice Brewer's suggestion
and, instead of urging such an endorsement of the Code on the states,
drafted a form of oath to be taken on admission to the bar.62
The convention adopted the new Code and went forth from the
ABA's 1908 meeting in Seattle, for eventual adoption by a majority of
the states, burdened with the most serious complaint that was ever to be
made against it-that the Code was nothing more than a pious declara-
tion of what a lawyer ought to do.
In truth, of course, this Code was just that-a collection of aspira-
tional statements of what a lawyer ought to do, often couched in fairly
general terms, 63 combined in no particular order with statements of
58. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 2; DRINKER, supra note 5, at 310.
59. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 13; Baldwin, supra note 55, at 544;
DRINKER, supra note 5, at 312. The Alabama Code had permitted contingent fee contracts, but
reluctantly. "Contingent fees may be contracted for, but they lead to many abuses, and certain
compensation is to be preferred." Baldwin, supra note 55, at 544 citing Alabama Code, Canon 5 1;
DRINKER, supra note 5, at 362.
60. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 31; DRINKER, supra note 5, at 320.
61. Baldwin, supra note 55, at 546.
62. Baldwin, supra note 55, at 545.
63. The assertion made in Canon 2 that
[t]he aspiration of lawyers for judicial position should be governed by an impartial esti-
mate of their ability to add honor to the office and not by a desire for the distinction the
position may bring to themselves
is a good example. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 2.
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minimum standards which declared what a lawyer "should not do."
There was not, however, any internal statement establishing that the
Code was to serve as the basis for discipline for violations of the mini-
mal standards. It was a "toothless tiger" waiting for the various states
to give it enforcement effect. In this respect, of course, it resembled the
earlier codes after which it was modeled.
As the years passed there were other and more specific complaints
against the 1908 Code:
The ... code of ethics ... appears to be a haphazard mixture of
specific, precise prohibitory rules designed for use as a disciplinary
code and of affirmative, edifying statements of guiding principles-
although unfortunately the latter are often more overstated than ap-
pealing and more assertive than informative.
64
[T]here is a tendency to regard the code either as being an expres-
sion of ethical goals or as being a disciplinary code of minimum stan-
dards, rather than taking it for what it is: an accidental combination
of the two.
65
.. [The form of the present code of ethics is one of exaggerated
exhortations arranged in helter-skelter fashion.
6 6
... The Canons of Ethics are virtually unteachable.67
• . . [O]ne of their most serious flaws is that they are directed al-
most entirely to the litigation situation. Yet our profession as a
whole devotes the overwhelming percentage of its time to office
practice.68
• . . [T]he Canons are, to a very large extent, a hodge-podge ...
There is no particular order or development to them. Some are gen-
eralizations . . . Others are quite specific. .. And others have no
coherent order or development which leads the reader from one
phase to the next.69
... In an era of solo practitioners with offices in small communi-
ties, where ethical questions were clear-cut, black or white, seldom
gray, and lawyers were neighbors of their clients, the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics served the legal profession well. As society has be-
come more complex the Canons have become less effective as a basis
for governing a profession composed of large and small firms, corpo-
rate legal departments, and government lawyers.7°
. . . The 'weaknesses of the present canons are four-fold.' These
64. Sutton, A Re-evaluation of the Canons oProfessional Ethics: A Revisor's Viewpoint, 33
TENN. L. REv. 132, 136 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Sutton 11.
65. Sutton I, supra note 64, at 137.
66. Sutton I, supra note 64, at 138.
67. Mathews, The Legal Profession Course, 41 COLO. L. REV. 379, 381 (1969).
68. Sears, .4 Re-evaluation ofthe Canons of Professional Ethics-A Professor's Viewpoint, 33
TENN. L. REV. 145, 147 (1966).
69. Sears, supra, at 160.
70. Cady, supra note 2, at 222.
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weaknesses [are] (A) their lack of application to disciplinary enforce-
ment, (B) the many areas of law not covered, (C) out-of-date lan-
guage, and (D) their failure to 'constitute a format or a blueprint for
inspirational action by individual lawyers and the bar as an organ-
ized entity.'7 '
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President of the ABA in 1964-65, probably
summed up the criticisms best:
Many aspects of the practice of law have changed significantly since
1908. When the original canons were framed, the typical lawyer was
a general practitioner, usually alone, who divided his time between
the courts and a family-lawyer office practice. There were very few
large law firms, few corporate legal departments and few lawyers
working for government. There was virtually no administrative law;
no income tax law; no great body of corporate law practice; and little
specialization in the practice. The flood of tort litigation was yet to
come.
72
The pressure for reform built slowly but steadily. In 1924 the Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics of the ABA concluded that "it might be
more desirable to have the canons consist of a statement of fundamen-
tal principles that should govern a lawyer's conduct rather than of defi-
nite rules as to specific items of 'conduct.'" But the committee did not
suggest any concrete changes.73
In 1933 the ABA Special Committee on Canons of Ethics defended
the Code, pointing out that it was "not an endeavor to formulate a
statement of general principles or to make a philosophic subdivision of
topics according to a lawyer's several relations to others." A better
code could be drafted, the committee agreed, "[b]ut the existing canons
have undoubtedly been useful."74 Two years later the same committee
recommended either a revision of the canons or that a supplemental
code of practice be drafted."
In 1955, at the request of the ABA, the American Bar Foundation
undertook a study of the need for expansion of the canons. The com-
mittee making the study for the Foundation found that the canons were
deficient in four principal respects:
(1) The Canons do not concentrate sufficiently on the professional
activities of lawyers...
(2) The Canons are not arranged in such a way as to make their
71. Cady, supra note 2, at 223.
72. Swindler, supra note 53, at 795.
73. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility" Its History & Objectives, 24 ARK. L.
Rv. 1, 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
74. Wright, supra note 73, at 3.
75. Wright, supra note 73, at 4.
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importance easily understood, and to make clear their relation to the
statements of principles which they contain...
(3) The Canons do not present in sufficient detail and variety the
guides useful to the individual lawyer in the determination of solu-
tions to ethical problems arising in specific situations encountered in
actual practice...
(4) The form and content of the Canons are not suited to discipli-
nary proceedings.
76
Then, in August 1964, at the request of ABA President Powell, the
House of Delegates of the Association created the Special Committee
on Evaluation of Ethical Standards. After intensive study of the short-
comings of the canons, this committee concluded that mere amendment
of the canons would not fill the need for an adequate statement of pro-
fessional responsibility. The committee then turned to the drafting of
an entirely new document 77 and by July 1, 1969, had drafted the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.
78
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
What a legal code of ethics should consist of was no more settled at
that time than it is now. Clearly such a code ought to provide some
"aspirational reach," some outline of a higher and better role to which
a lawyer should aspire. In addition, it should prescribe basic and fun-
damental duties-toward other lawyers, toward clients, and toward so-
ciety-the violation of which can result in sanctions. Moreover, a
viable code should perform these two functions in a clear and under-
standable fashion. As to this second goal in particular, the code should
classify for the lawyer what is the "law" of legal ethics, i.e., what are
the rights and duties of the lawyer in performing a particular role for
the client.79 Finally, a code should not only be clear and understanda-
76. Wright, supra note 73, at 4.
77. Armstrong, supra note 3, at 4.
78. See Wright, supra note 73, at 6.
79. As Dean L. Ray Patterson explained it:
Underlying the emerging law of legal ethics are several propositions that may aid thelawyer in assessing the Rules .. .. The first proposition is that rules of ethics are not
discretionary ethical rules, but rules of law, and they are in fact extensions of, and com-plem ntary to, general law. The second proposition is that the lawyer-client relationship
has two bases: contract and status. It is the status aspect of the relationship to which the
law of legal ethics is primarily directed for it is the status of the lawyer as an officer of thelegal system that precludes him from being simply an agent of the client. The thirdproposition is that there are only three basic standards of conduct for the lawyer: loyalty
to the client, candor to the tribunal, and fairness to others, including the opponent...
The fourth proposition is that the rights and duties of the lawyer in acting for the client
are derived from the rights and duties of the client.
Patterson, An Analysis of the Propo uled Aies of rofessional Conduct, 31 MERCER L. RV. 645, 647
(1980) Ihereinafter cited as Patterson I].
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ble, but it should lend itself to the teaching of its basic concepts and the
nuances deriving therefrom.
To their credit, the drafters of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity strove to keep separate the aspirational goals and the required mini-
mal standards of the new Code. But they did so in such a radically
different fashion that clarity was sacrificed. The resulting Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility was an abrupt departure from the canons in
two important and highly visible respects: appearance and organiza-
tion. It was organized on the basis of nine fundamental concepts re-
garding lawyers' ethics. Within these nine broad areas, called
"Canons,"' 0 the Code was further divided into two main components:
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules. As the Preliminary
Statement to the Code defined them:
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and repre-
sent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive...
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being sub-
ject to disciplinary action. 1
The new Code attempted to deal with two major defects in the old
canons; the lack of any organization or structure, and the haphazard
mixture of minimum disciplinary standards and mere aspirational
statements.8 2
In matters of basic ethics, however, the changes in the new Code
were mostly variations of emphasis and scope. There were, in fact,
only four changes in the "law" of legal ethics reflected in the document.
First, old Canon 34 had prohibited fee-splitting, except where based
on a division of services or responsibility. DR 2-107(A)(1) & (3) of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibited fee-splitting except
where based on a division of services and responsibility.
Second, the new Code permitted the lawyer to use, "in connection
with his name, an earned degree or title derived therefrom indicating
80. A "canon" under the Code of Professional Responsibility is quite different from a canon
under the old Code. The Code of Professional Responsibility defines canons as "statements of
axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of
lawyers in their relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession."
See generally ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. In the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility canons are little more than chapter headings, organizing the main body of the Code
into nine chapters. Under the old Code, however, the "canons" were everything. Sutton, Profes-
sionalResponsibility: Mhat'r New About the New Code?, 41 PA. B.A.Q. 127, 132 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Sutton II].
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement.
82. See Sutton II, supra note 80, at 129-30.
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his training in the law." 3 The old canons had said nothing on this
subject but ABA Opinion No. 321 (1969) had prohibited the use of the
title "Doctor" by recipients of the J.D. degree.
Third, DR 2-102(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility pro-
hibited a legislator from leaving his name in the firm name when not
actively and regularly practicing as a member of the firm. The old ca-
nons were silent on this subject but ABA Opinion No. 318 (1967) had
said that if a lawyer intended to hold office only "temporarily" he
could leave his name in the firm name "but only if proper precautions
are taken not to mislead the public as to his degree of participation in
the firm's affairs."
And finally, DR 6-101(A)(3) made neglect of a legal matter entrusted
to a lawyer a matter of legal ethics. The old Code was silent on this
subject.
84
With these four exceptions, then, the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility was, as to matters of substance, a re-draft of the old 1908 ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics, a document that was itself a virtual
recodification of the Alabama Code of Ethics of 1887. As a body of
"law of ethics" the Code of Professional Responsibility was essentially
unchanged from its 1908 predecessor-while the profession to which it
would apply had undergone vast changes in the intervening sixty-one
years.
Predictably, the Code of Professional Responsibility played to mixed
reviews from the very beginning. Some saw the new Code in a positive
light:
... In the long run, the structural innovations in the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility should prove to be greatly beneficial to the
ethical climate of the profession.
85
... The old Canons lasted about 70 years and the new Code is a
decided improvement, so it should last longer.
8 6
However, the more common reaction was negative:
... Though few could quarrel with the Canons, themselves, their
implementation in the Disciplinary Rules demonstrates such insensi-
tivity to the basic rights of both attorney and client, that many will
demand a total revision.87
83. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE No. 2-102(E).
Hereinafter the Codes Ethical Considerations will be cited as ECs and Disciplinary Rules as DRs.
84. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3).
85. Sutton II, supra note 80, at 135.
86. Latto, D.C. BarAssociation to Vote on New Code of Professional Responsibility, 37 D.C. B.
J. 57, 67 (1970).
87. Brown, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: In Defense of Mediocrity, 16 CATH.
LAW. 314, 325 (1970).
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And a law student from the University of Kansas criticized the Code
for
codifying rather conservative views on problems of legal ethics rather
than encouraging innovations to meet the needs of a rapidly chang-
ing society. Instead of helping the legal profession serve society, the
new Code may make that task even more difficult."8
The pragmatic approach was taken by Professor Cady who had
served as chairman of the Committee on Ethics and Grievances of his
state bar association: "Better to have a code that will muster the neces-
sary votes when presented for adoption than the ideal code that fails of
enactment."89 The unquestioned accuracy of this observation fails to
mask the sense of futility inherent in the statement.
Among the other problems the Code of Professional Responsibility
was to face was its misfortune of coming into being at the wrong time.
The Watergate scandal and the highly placed and very visible lawyers
who were trapped in that ethical morass led to a great deal of profes-
sional soul searching, including the 1974 amendment to the ABA Edu-
cational Standards which advocated that teaching the Code of
Professional Responsibility in law schools be mandatory. 90 Inevitably,
the failure of the present ethical code to "prevent" the lawyers' involve-
ment in Watergate reflected on that code. Moreover, the Watergate
affair led to a resurgence of interest in legal ethics in general and the
Code of Professional Responsibility was subjected to an intense scru-
tiny as a part of that general interest. Many found the new Code want-
ing. For instance, public defenders and legal aid lawyers found the
Code's provisions relating to the providing of legal services for the poor
to be inadequate and in some respects even harmful.9' And, Professor
Thomas D. Morgan of the University of Illinois College of Law, ar-
gued that the Code was guilty of misordering of priorities, putting the
public interest last, the client's interest next and the interest of the indi-
vidual lawyer first.92 Another scholar, Dean L. Ray Patterson of the
Emory University School of Law, contending that the Code was "a
transitional document, representing a middle stage in the development
of law for lawyers," described it as "rigid and simplistic, complex and
88. Witten, .4BA Code of Professional Responsibili-Law Student'r Viewpoint on the New
Canons, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 702, 709 (1970).
89. Cady, supra note 2, at 248.
90. Jones, Lawyers andJustice: The Uneasy Ethics ofPartsansho, 23 VILL. L. REV. 957, 958-
59 (1978).
91. See generally Kettleson, Revising the Code of Professional Responsibility, 35 NATIONAL
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION BRIEFCASE 40 (1978).
92. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARv. L. REV. 702, 706
(1977).
1982 / Proposed Model Rules
contradictory, and difficult to read. ' 93 The negative feeling about the
Code was, perhaps, best summed up by a professor from Columbia
University, who described it as "[a] good try, but not really good
enough."
94
The result of this continuing inquiry into the professional conduct of
lawyers and the considerable discontent with the Code of Professional
Responsibility was the reference by the ABA of the Code to the Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards for further study.
95
That Commission's study of the Code of Professional Responsibility
led it to the conclusion that, as the Commission later reported, "more
than a series of amendments or a general statement of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibilty was in order. . . a comprehensive refor-
mulation was required." 96 The result was the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
If the Code of Professional Responsibility is-as Dean Patterson sug-
gests-"a transitional document, representing a middle stage in the de-
velopment of law for lawyers," 97 the Model Rules may also represent
merely another stage in the long struggle to develop law for lawyers. It
represents, in format and organization, as vast a break with the Code of
Professional Responsibility as that document was with the Canons of
Professional Ethics. And, in matters of substance, the Model Rules are
even further away from the Code of Professional Responsibility than
was that document from its predecessor.
It is important to remember, however, that, as one writer put it, "the
statutory rules of conduct that regulate American lawyers do not un-
93. Dean Patterson called for a new Code of Professional Responsibility based on these
premises:
(1) The lawyer is more than an advocate serving the interests of a client; he is an ad-
ministrator of law, a private citizen fulfilling public responsibilities.
(2) The three basic standards of conduct for the lawyer are loyalty, candor, and
fairness.
(3) The implementation of the standard varies according to three major factors:
(a) the particular role of the lawyer--that is, an adviser, advocate, agent, private
adjudicator, and law maker,
(b) the process of law administration in which the lawyer is engaged: the judicial,
the administrative, the legislative, or the private legal process; and
(c) the rights and duties of the client.
Patterson, Wanted- A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A.J. 639, 640 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Patterson I1]. Dean Patterson served as legal consultant to the Kutak Commission
and much of his thinking is reflected in the Model Rules.
94. Jones, supra note 90, at 960.
95. The Code, notwithstanding the work that had gone into it, was clearly in need of re-
thinking.
96. DIscussIoN DRAFT OF ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT i.
97. Patterson II, supra note 93, at 639.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol 13
dertake to create new ethical requirements, but simply define those that
are inherent in the practice of law itself. '9 8 Thus, we are not dealing
with a whole new set of concepts of professional "conduct" or "ethics"
or "responsibility," but with yet another refinement of some basic rules
that have been with us since the very beginning, and with our subtly
changing views of these rules. Certain concepts may change, for exam-
ple, the acceptability of the contingent fee contract, or notions of what
constitutes acceptable advertising, but even these changes stem from
basic ideas about the practice of law and our efforts to maintain high
standards while remaining in tune with modem business and profes-
sional developments.
Yet any new codification of "law for lawyers," even if it is grounded
on the same basic principles, can, because of different focus and ap-
proach, make an enormous difference in what lawyers do and how they
do it. An inquiry into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is,
then, most appropriate.
To begin-a few first impressions about the new Code. First, it is
decidedly non-sexist. In place of the universal use of the pronoun "he"
by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the new Code simply says
"he or she" or "the lawyer." It is a small matter, perhaps, but a step in
the right direction. The Model Rules approach moves away from the
"detail and triviality" of the Code of Professional Responsibility pres-
ent, for example, in Canon 2 and the amazing detail about what can
appear on a lawyer's stationery. In addition the new Code is less
"preachy" and more practical. In particular, it addresses the lawyer as
he or she must function in the modem world to a degree that was never
attempted by the Code of Professional Responsibility. While the com-
ments to the Model Rules repeatedly offer aspirational guides, the spe-
cial, if nonetheless confusing, role of the Ethical Considerations as an
aspirational document is missing. Finally the Model Rules approach
makes for much easier reading. Ethical codes for lawyers will never
rank near the top of anyone's reading list, but lending itself to easier
understanding is an important goal of any legal document.
The Model Rules format is different from the tri-partite organization
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It consists of black letter
law rules with commentary, a stylistic approach with which most law-
yers have become familiar through the American Law Institute's Re-
statement of Law. And, instead of being broken into separate,
numbered paragraphs with the implication that each stands more or
less alone, as the 130 Ethical Considerations in the present Code, the
98. Armstrong, supra note 3, at 1.
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comments read as comments should-as a logical exposition of the tex-
tual matter of the Rules.
The proposed Rules clearly constitute legislation-court-adopted ad-
ministrative regulations, perhaps-but black letter law just the same.
That, theoretically, was to have been the role of the Disciplinary Rules
under the Code of Professional Responsibility, but unfortunately the
Ethical Considerations tended to take on that role, too. Where, for ex-
ample, the Ethical Considerations merely restate the Disciplinary
Rules they obviously are not merely aspirational but have become
mandatory like the Disciplinary Rule they restate.99 Moreover, when
an Ethical Consideration states, as does EC 5-15, "A lawyer should
never. . .," it obviously is couched in more than merely aspirational
langauge. For example, the Supreme Court of Iowa took the matter to
its ultimate conclusion in 1979 and held that violation of an ethical
consideration, standing alone, will support disciplinary action."° Two
years earlier, however, an Indiana Court of Appeals had taken the
more common position and held that "the Disciplinary Rules, and not
the Ethical Considerations, prescribe the conduct which constitutes a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility."'' °0 So much,
then, for the argument that adoption of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility in the fifty states has resulted in uniformity in the process-
ing of disciplinary complaints.
As this distinction between the Disciplinary Rules and the Ethical
Considerations has become blurred, and even disappeared as in Iowa,
the fundamental reason for the unusual organization of the Code of
Professional Responsibility has become less important. Yet, restructur-
ing the format of our ethical code is not a matter to be undertaken
lightly and one of the principal criticisms of the proposed Code has
been this very change.' 0 2 In public hearings held by the Kutak Com-
mission to receive comments on the proposed Rules from members of
the bar and others, considerable objection was had to the change in
format.10 3
99. Ethical Considerations 5-14 and 5-15 restate Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) and quite clearly
are not addressing themselves to purely aspirational matters.
100. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Behnke, 276 N.W. 2d 838 (Iowa 1979).
The effect of this decision is to completely obscure any distinction between the ethical considera-
tions and disciplinary rules in Iowa.
101. Kizer v. Davis, 369 N.E. 2d 439, 444 (Ind. 1977).
102. "[W]e have found substantial sentiment favoring retention of the form of the present
code." Letter from Commission Chairman Robert J. Kutak, addressed to "Dear Colleagues,"
(Dec. 5, 1980).
103. Richard Moser, Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the New York County Lawyers
Association, complained that the commission had thrown out old language that has come to have
particular meaning. Summary of Comments of Speakers Before Public Hearing of the Commis-
sion on Evaluation of Professional Standards in New York City 4 (May 5, 1980). Victor Drexel,
Chairman of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Re-
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The National Organization of Bar Counsel (hereinafter referred to as
NOBC), a respected organization of counsel to state bar associations
throughout the United States, has also objected to the proposed change
in format, raising concerns that are well-reasoned and worthy of con-
sideration."w The NOBC argues that the adoption of a new Code (as
opposed to mere revision of the present Code) "would seriously impair
the acceptability and effectiveness of a Model Code, and substantially
undermine the giant strides which have been achieved since the adop-
tion of the format and construction of the present Code of Professional
Responsibility."105
The reasons for this belief are, essentially, that lawyers are familiar
with the Code of Professional Responsibility, since nearly one-half of
all practicing lawyers are post-1970 graduates and have studied the
Code in law school and "the remaining one-half have practiced under
the present Code for ten years;" that a substantial body of law has
grown-up around the present format and would be lost under a com-
pletely different structure; and that the "absence of voiced need for
change in format along with historical reluctance to depart from
proven forms suggests that many jurisdictions would be reluctant to
adopt the Model Rules in its present format."106
As a former Executive Director of a unified state bar, one of the du-
ties of which was to process all ethical complaints against lawyers in the
state and all ethical inquiries made by lawyers in the state and a pres-
ent member of the Legal Ethics Committee of that same bar, I have
serious questions about how familiar today's lawyers really are with the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Given the confusing format of the
Code, the fact that today's lawyers may "have studied" or "practiced
under" this Code is hardly justification for the assumption that these
lawyers really know the Code, let alone are well served by it. The same
argument could have been made, and no doubt was made, in favor of
the old Canons and against the "new" Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. But, assuming that the Model Rules are an improvement, this
sponsibility, indicated that his committee would prefer to amend the present Code. Id at 11.
Luther Avery of the American College of Probate Counsel, said in Honolulu, on August 5, 1980,
that he believed the restatement format to be inferior to "that format which is familiar to us."
Oscar M. Beubhausen, President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and
Professor Eleanor M. Fox of New York University Law School expressed reservations about
abandoning the present code which they described as "generally carefully drafted, thoughtful and
wise.,
104. The National Organization of Bar Counsel is an organization of counsel to state bar
associations throughout the United States. The organization was founded in 1965 and incorpo-
rated in 1977. NAr'L ORGANIZATION B. COUNSEL REPORT ON A STUDY OF THE PROPOSED ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS I [hereinafter cited as
NOBC REPORT].
105. NOBC REPORT, supra note 104, at 2.
106. NOBC REPORT, supra note 104, at 3.
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argument is not very persuasive. l0 7
Similarly, the fact that a substantial body of law has grown up
around the Code of Professional Responsibility is no reason not to
adopt a new code, if the new code represents an improvement. True, it
will be necessary to "build" a new body of law around the new lan-
guage of a new code, but this problem is faced wherever there is any
substantial revision of a statute or recodification of the law. Commis-
sion Chairman Kutak perhaps explains this best:
Lawyers have managed to weather-and indeed, adapt quickly to-
the replacement of probate statutes by the Uniform Probate Code,
the replacement of a number of commercial statutes by the U.C.C.,
and a complete revision of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. I am con-
fident in their abilities to adjust to a revision of our ethics code.1
0 8
This same problem was faced by the profession when the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility was adopted after lawyers had lived for nearly
70 years under the old Canons. Surely the profession can adapt to
change after barely a decade under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.'09
As to the absence of voiced need for change in format, the Kutak
Commission's very existence is a reflection of concern over the need for
change in general. The change in format is the result of this commis-
sion's attempt to address the need for revision in general. Perhaps the
reason the need for a change in format was never voiced was that no
one had considered how to improve the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility to the extent that the Kutak Commission did.'10 The absence of
107. Unfamiliarity with the Code of Professional Responsibility is almost commonplace
among the members of the practicing bar of my acquaintance. I often address lawyer groups
(CLE seminars, prosecuting attorney meetings, and the like) and have yet to encounter a group of
practicing lawyers who evidence any real familiarity with the Code of Professional Responsibility.
I am persuaded (given my contacts within the profession throughout the country) that this is not a
purely West Virginia phenomenon. When I was Executive Director of the West Virginia State
Bar, I received at least three telephone calls per week from lawyers inquiring about what the Code
of Professional Responsibility said. At least 75% of these questions concerned matters on which
the Code was clear and unambiguous. I was repeatedly told, "I don't understand these rules" or
"I can't seem to find anything in them." Given my past acquaintanceship with the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility and the fact that I now teach Professional Responsibility, I still receive
two or three inquiries per month about the contents of the Code from lawyers who just aren't
willing to dig through a format that is completely unfamiliar to them.
108. Remarks by Robert J. Kutak at an ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline
Workshop on Disciplinary Law and Procedure held in Scottsdale, Arizona (June 5, 1980) (copy on
file at the Pac#Fc Law Journal).
109. Admittedly, however, this last decade has been a "busy" one in the ethical field and no
doubt more law has grown up around the subject in this decade than in any similar period under
the old canons.
110. Commission Chairman Kutak discussed this question in the Scottsdale, Arizona,
workshop.
Why change the code format? Wouldn't an amendment accomplish the same pur-
pose?
We could have taken that approach and it may have satisfactorily addressed some of
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"voiced need for change in format" is indicative of nothing.
A big change in format brought about by the Model Rules is the
organization of the code under the various roles the lawyer assumes,
reflecting the view of the Kutak Commission that a lawyer's ethical
duties vary depending on the role the lawyer is performing.
The Model Rules division is: (1) Client-Lawyer Relationship, which
includes such subjects as diligence, fees, conflict of interest, and confi-
dentiality; (2) Counselor; (3) Advocate; (4) Transactions With Per-
sons Other Than Clients; (5) Law Firms & Associations; (6) Public
Service; (7) Information About Legal Services; and (8) Maintaining
the Integrity of the Profession."1'
The concept underlying this organization is that lawyers perform
many different roles with the precise ethical requirements varying ac-
cording to the role being performed. In one instance, at least, the ex-
isting Code of Professional Responsibility already recognizes that
different standards may obtain depending on the lawyer's role. EC 7-3
provides: "Where the bounds of the law are uncertain, the action of a
lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser. A
lawyer may serve simultaneously as both advocate and adviser, but the
two roles are essentially different."
A variety of groups has opposed the proposed format of the Model
Rules. The NOBC, for instance, has opposed the organizational struc-
ture of the January 1980 "Discussion Draft" of the Model Rules, which
also recognized the application of different standards to different roles,
and presumably will oppose the similar organization of the Final Draft.
The NOBC has complained that the Discussion Draft "creates a false
illusion that different ethical standards apply to different areas of
practice.""l
2
the issues in ethics and some of the issues raised in connection with the Code. We chose
on a number of grounds, however, to pursue a different tack.
For one, to add specific provisions for the roles and practice settings that the Code
ignores would have further complicated an already complex piece of legislation. On this
point it should be noted that even without extensive amendment, many practitioners--
who, unlike yourselves, have no expertise in legal ethics-find the Code's structure and
organization inconvenient and very difficult to use.
A more convenient and familiar format, one paralleling the recently adopted Code of
Judicial Conduct and similar to the ALI Restatements of the law, seemed to us more
conducive to the extensive additions that must be made. Accordingly, after much con-
sideration, we adopted such a format for the proposed rules.
Introduction to the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA Standing Committee on
Professional Discipline, Workshop on Disciplinary Law Procedure, Scottsdale, Arizona 9-10
(June 5, 1980) (copy on file at the Pacofic Law Journal).
The author has railed privately for years about the absolute unworkability of the present Code's
organization. Other lawyers have shared this opinion with me. I suspect that the support for the
present tripartite organization is not nearly so widespread or deep as the Code's supporters would
insist.
I11. FINAL DRAFT OF ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (May 30, 1981).
112. NOBC REPORT, supra note 104, at 3. It is perhaps uncharitable to suggest it, but some of
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The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Association (hereinaf-
ter referred to as ATLA), unhappy with both the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Discussion Draft of the Model Rules, though it
clearly prefers the Code of Professional Responsibility over the pro-
posed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1 3 has had its own code of
conduct drafted by Professor Monroe H. Freedman of the Hofstra Uni-
versity School of Law. Professor Freedman rejects "the idea of writing
this Code in separate sections for lawyers in litigation, negotiation, and
so forth,"I 4 and the ATLA Code, understandably perhaps, views all of
a lawyer's functions as part of an adversary role and speaks
accordingly.
For all the criticism it has received the Model Rules approach does
attempt to deal with a common criticism of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: that it treats all lawyers as if they were engaging in a
single kind of activity, what a participant in a conference of lawyers
held in Seven Springs, New York, once described as practice in "down-
state Illinois in the 1860's."' "5 In this respect, as in so many others, the
Code of Professional Responsibility was merely echoing the ABA's
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics.
The question of whether a lawyer's ethical duties and responsibilities
vary depending on the role the lawyer plays has already drawn blood
in the legal community and there is likely to be substantial debate on
the issue generating, as debates of this sort often do, more heat than
light.
The Model Rules concept of different standards for different roles,
however, is one that Dean Patterson has embraced for some time and
the NOBC's concern may be grounded in the fact that the Model Rules approach is from the
viewpoint of the practicing lawyer instead of from that of the organized bar and its disciplinary
machinery. To the extent that the Model Rules can help the lawyer before ethical problems de-
velop, this organization of the material may be a factor.
113. Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyer's Foundation, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE
OF CONDUCT 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ATLA CODE].
114. ATLA CODE, supra note 113, at 7. The whole concept of the lawyer having any duty to
anyone other than the client is an anathema to the American Trial Lawyer's Foundation. In the
Introduction to the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, ATLA President Theodore I. Koskoff
asserts that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct would make the lawyer "the agent of the
state, not the champion of the client, in many important respects." ATLA CODE, supra note 113,
at ili.
115. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 7 (1978). As Commission Chairman
Kutak put it,
Moday lawyers represent estates, trade unions, corporations, and other organizations;
lawyers function primarily outside the courtroom as advisers, mediators, negotiators and
evaluators; lawyers handle client problems through administrative agencies and appear
before legislative assemblies; lawyers increasingly associate in law firms rather than
function as sole practitioners; and lawyers move into and out of the government at a
steadily growing rate.
ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, Workshop on Disciplinary Law and Proce-
dures, Scottsdale, Arizona 5-6 (June 5, 1980).
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as the legal consultant to the Kutak Commission, he may well be the
father of the idea, at least insofar as its inclusion in the Model Rules is
concerned.
In a 1971 article in the American Bar Association Journal, Dean Pat-
terson described the roles of a lawyer as (1) Adviser; (2) Advocate;
(3) Agent; (4) Private Adjudicator; and (5) Law maker."I6 By 1980 he
had reduced this number to three: (1) Adviser; (2) Advocate; and
(3) Agent."i7 The whole idea of different standards for different roles
is based on the proposition, as Dean Patterson explains it, "that the
rights and duties of the lawyer in acting for the client are derived from
the rights and duties of the client."""
It is difficult to quarrel with this proposition. Lawyers exist today, as
they have throughout the profession's history, to represent or "stand
in" for clients. Clients are permitted to represent themselves before ju-
dicial tribunals and in dealing with others, but the structure of our legal
system is complicated and a specialized language has grown up around
it. So clients come to lawyers-a class of people learned in the lan-
guage, procedures, and technicalities of the law-and lawyers go before
judicial tribunals to argue the client's cause. But surely a lawyer has no
greater, or lesser, rights than does the client!
In the role of counselor, for example, the lawyer has the duty of ad-
vising the client on the law, what it is, what it is likely to be, and recom-
mending a course of action based on the law. The lawyer's duty here is
almost totally to the client.' 19
In the role of advocate, however, the lawyer also owes a duty to the
tribunal as it searches for the truth and to the opposing party not to
mislead it. And these duties to the court and to the opposing party are
not contrary to the client nor do they exist because the lawyer is a law-
yer. They are duties the client owes as a citizen seeking to use the court
system. The lawyer, as representative of the client, assumes those du-
ties along with the privilege of appearing for the client.
Thus where the lawyer advises the client and there is no one else now
involved who may be affected by the lawyer's conduct, the lawyer has
greater freedom, as does the client, and there is a lesser duty. But when
the lawyer appears as advocate, there now being others involved who
may be affected by the lawyer's conduct, a higher duty is demanded of
the lawyer. And even with the Model Rules "division" there are many
116. Patterson II, supra note 93, at 640.
117. Patterson I, supra note 79, at 662.
118. Patterson I, supra note 79, at 647.
119. Patterson I, supra note 79, at 662-63. (There is a duty to society not to give advice to the
client that would harm society, but in the advisory role that is minor.)
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duties that interrelate-for instance an advocate can find him or herself
acting as an adviser and vice versa. Moreover, as noted earlier, this
concept is not entirely new to the Model Rules, having been raised by
EC 7-3. Nor did the idea spring full-blown into EC 7-3 from nowhere.
In 1953 the late Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, described what he called "The Five Functions of
the Lawyer." 120 These he defined as: (1) Counselor; (2) Advocate;
(3) Improving the Profession, the Courts and the Law; (4) Leadership
in Molding Public Opinion; and (5) Holding Public Office.
It is true that Chief Justice Vanderbilt did not discuss different stan-
dards of conduct for these different roles, nor did he suggest that there
might be any difference. Nonetheless he saw, with the practiced eye of
a judge who had done a good deal of thinking about the legal system
and its problems, the lawyer's role as something less than monolithic.
It was a beginning of a realistic reappraisal of the lawyer's role.
In the Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility
in 1958121 the "legal profession" was said to "perform three major serv-
ices." These the report defined as (1) "the lawyer's role as advocate
and counselor;" (2) "the lawyer as one who designs a framework that
will give form and direction to collaborative effort;" and (3) "his third
service runs not to particular clients, but to the public as a whole." The
first of these three services was then treated in the report as two sepa-
rate roles-advocate and counselor-and the report noted that "these
two roles must be sharply distinguished."' 122 That same year (1958) the
ABA was asked to reappraise the Canons of Ethics to distinguish the
function of counselor from that of the advocate, 123 and the Association
of American Law Schools suggested that recognition of these two func-
tions was necessary to the training of law students. 124
The Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility,
moreover, recognized that the ethical responsibilities are often different
depending on the nature of the lawyer's role.125 "In the duties that the
lawyer must now undertake," the Report said, "the inherited traditions
of the Bar often yield but an indirect guidance. Principles of conduct
applicable to appearance in open court do not, for example, resolve the
issues confronting the lawyer who must assume the delicate task of me-
120. Vanderbilt, The Five Functions of a Lawyer, 23 UTAH B. BULL. 173, 173-81 (1953), re-
printedin 40 A.B.A. J. 31, 31-34 (1954).
121. 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Report].
122. Id at 1161.
123. McCoy, The Canons of Ethics: A Reappraisal by the Organized Bar, 43 A.B.A. J. 38
(1958).
124. Association Am. L. Schools Program and Report of Committees 111-27 (1958).
125. See generally Report, supra note 121.
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diating among opposing interests."' 26 The Report concluded with a
special plea for guidance for the lawyer: "a lawyer stands today in spe-
cial need of a clear understanding of his obligations and of the vital
connection between those obligations and the role his profession plays
in society."' 2
"Any revision of the Canons," one writer said in 1961, "must take
into account and speak to this new and now predominant function of
the lawyer" as a counselor.'28 And so the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility did-in a "glancing reference" in EC 7-3, but nowhere
else.
Now, at last, in the Model Rules, we are offered a set of ethical rules
for lawyers that take into account the different roles of the modem law-
yer and the different ethical demands of those roles. One should not
underemphasize the importance of this change in approach. It signals
something fundamental in our understanding of the lawyer's profes-
sional role-that lawyers are not a monolithic body of professionals, all
doing the same thing in the same way and for the same purpose. To be
sure, there are those who disagree, who argue that lawyers are lawyers
and the rules never change. But there is a compelling logic to the con-
cept which one who must deal with ethical complaints against lawyers
in all areas of the practice must find refreshing. But the battle has only
begun on this question.
As significant as these changes in organization of the Model Rules
are, however, they are for the most part overshadowed by changes of
substance in certain of the ethical rules themselves. These changes re-
flect, on the whole, an effort to place the profession's ethical guidelines
in line with modem business practices and socio-economic develop-
ments as well as to reflect the most recent thinking on the role of law-
yers in American society and to bring our ethical rules into agreement
with recent court rulings. The changes are not without controversy.
Model Rule 1.5(d), regarding fee splitting, is a good example.
FEE-SPLITTING
The Code of Professional Responsibility permits a division of fees
between lawyers who do not practice together only if the share of each
lawyer is in proportion to the responsibility assumed and services only
rendered by each.' 2 9 But Model Rule 1.5(d) would allow a division of
fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm if- (1) the division
126. Report, supra note 121, at 1160.
127. Report, supra note 121, at 1160.
128. Thode, The Ethical Standardfor the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REV. 575, 578 (1961).
129. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107, EC-34.
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is in proportion to services performed by each lawyer or the lawyers
agree in writing to assume responsibility for the representation; (2) the
client consents to participation by all the lawyers involved; and (3) the
total fee is reasonable.
Presumably the Commission felt that no harm could come to the cli-
ent by permitting fee splitting since it would encourage a lawyer to
refer a complicated matter in an area in which the referring lawyer did
not feel competent to a lawyer in whose competence the referring law-
yer had confidence. Without a fee for the referral, the lawyer first em-
ployed by the client would have lost all potential fee for the matter and
would have had no reason, other than the requirements of DR 2-107, to
refer the matter elsewhere. Moreover, Rule 1.5(d) requires that the to-
tal fee be reasonable and so that in theory at least, it costs the client
nothing for a referral. In addition, all the lawyers involved are totaly
responsible to the client thus "assuring" that the referring lawyer will
refer the matter to a competent lawyer.
The comment to Rule 1.5(d) asserts, "[a] division of fee facilitates
association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone
could serve the client as well. . . ." In the "Legal Background" to
Rule 1.5 it is pointed out that Rule 1.5(d) "restores Canon 34 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, which stated: 'No division of fees is
proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility.' "130 But neither comment really explains why the
change was made. However, the comment to the Discussion Draft of
the Model Rules had suggested that the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility limitation, that a division of fees could only be made if the share
of each lawyer was in proportion to the responsibility assumed and the
services rendered by each lawyer, was "often ignored in practice and
can be artificial."'' These, however, are poor reasons for changing the
rule.
It is difficult to imagine that allowing a referral fee will not result in a
higher overall fee to the client. Assuming that the lawyer who does the
work is not already unethically overcharging for his or her time, a piece
of work will ordinarily be worth so much money. At a minimum, the
lawyer cannot afford to charge significantly less than what the work is
worth in order to allow the referring lawyer to receive a fee for simply
"directing" the case to the working lawyer. As the Committee on Pro-
fessional & Judicial Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York put it: "Fee splitting is perceived by the public as a form of
130. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, MODEL RULE 1.5, Notes, Subsection Legal
Background 37.
131. ABA MODEL RULE 1.6, Comment (Discussion Draft).
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exploitation and, in our view, usually results in higher than necessary
charges."' z And a basic question remains: Why should a lawyer re-
ceive a fee for merely being a good advertiser or being in the right place
at the right time? The very possibility of approved referral fees con-
jures up visions of a new class of "lawyers," in a profession already
becoming crowded, who are adept at clever advertising, move with ease
through the local news columns, appear at the scene of all major acci-
dents, call at the funeral home during the viewing of persons with sig-
nificant estates, and earn a living by simply gathering up cases and
referring them to others.
Furthermore, what of the possibility that Lawyer A-hungry, inex-
perienced and without clients-will offer a higher "finder's fee" than
Lawyer B, who is an established lawyer of demonstrated competence
with plenty of clients? Surely the temptation is there for the "referring
lawyer" to refer a client to Lawyer A. The principle is the same as the
one behind the rule prohibiting the sale of a law practice-that the
seller will be influenced to select the highest bidder, not the lawyer who
might be best for the client.
Curiously, the NOBC accepts this change without question, noting
that referral fees are in existence throughout the country despite the
fact that they are prohibited. The new rule, the NOBC report blandly
notes, "seeks to regulate rather than prohibit them."' 3 That referral
fees are common today is surely no reason to approve them if they are
wrong. The sale of a law practice is common in certain areas of the
country 134 but it is still unethical.1
3 5
Model Rule 1.5(d) is an abrupt departure from a sound rule that was
itself a tightening of former practice. As noted earlier, Canon 34 of the
1908 Code prohibited a division of fees for legal services except where
the division was "based upon a division of service or responsibility,"
leaving open the possibility of splitting fees if the referring lawyer was
willing to assume part of the responsibility to the client.' 3 6 This was a
change from a practice of long standing whereby a referring lawyer was
allowed, as a matter of course, a "finder's fee" regardless of whether
any service was performed or responsibility assumed by the referring
132. Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics ofthe Association ofthe Bar ofthe City of
New York, Reports on the January 30, 1980, Discussion Draft ofModelRules ofProfessional Con-
duct 77.
133. NOBC REPORT, supra note 104, at 28.
134. At least it is a fairly common practice among solo practitioners in parts of West Virginia.
135. It is violative of ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-103(B) (which prohibits
paying another to recommend or secure employment as a lawyer); DR 2-107(A) (which prohibits
fee splitting) and DR 4-101(B) (which prohibits a lawyer from revealing confidences and secrets of
his/ier clients).
136. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETics No. 34 (emphasis added).
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lawyer. 137
Drinker, in his work on legal ethics, said that the purpose of Canon
34 "should not be frustrated by construing the necessity of 'responsibil-
ity' as being satisfied by the bare recommendation."'' 38 In fact this was
the repeated holding of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics.
DR 2-107, by requiring any division of a fee to be "made in proportion
to the services performed and responsibility assumed" by the lawyers
involved, effectively eliminated ethical fee splitting except where the
referring lawyer also did some of the work. This was a sound rule.
Model Rule 1.5(d) is not an improvement.
In contrast, the ATLA Code provides: "Lawyers who are not openly
associated in the same firm shall not share a fee unless: (a) the division
reflects the proportion of work performed by each attorney and the
normal billing rate of each; OR (b) the client has been informed pursu-
ant to Rule 5.2 of the fact of fee-sharing and the effect on the total fee,
and the client consents."'13 9 Note, then, that there is no requirement
here that the total fee charged to the client be no higher than if a refer-
ral were not made-thus fee-splitting under this rule would most cer-
tainly result in a higher fee overall, except where the contingent fee is
utilized.
Model Rule 1.5(d), the ATLA Code and the NOBC by condoning
fee splitting seem unconcerned about the effects of fee splitting. Such
condonation appears to be inconsistent with high standards applied to
a profession that is supposed to be concerned, above all else, with the
clients it serves.
CLIENT'S PERJURY
What to do when the client wants to take the stand and commit per-
jury is one of the most difficult problems in legal ethics. The Code of
Professional Responsibility waffled and refused to take a stand.
DR 4-101(C)(3) permitted the lawyer to reveal both the intention of
his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent
it. This was consistent with an ABA ethics opinion which required that
a lawyer disclose confidences of his client "if the facts in the attorney's
possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be com-
mitted."'' 40 This duty to disclose confidences was held to extend even
to revealing the whereabouts of a client who had skipped bail, even if
137. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 186.
138. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 186.
139. ATLA CODE, supra note 113, Rule 5.4.
140. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965).
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this knowledge was in confidence from the client.141
In contrast, however, DR 7-102(B)(1) states that when a lawyer
learns that his client has "perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribu-
nal," the lawyer must "call upon his client to rectify the same." If the
client refuses to rectify the fraud the lawyer must reveal the fraud to the
affected person or tribunal "except when the information is protected
as a privileged communication."' 42 Is knowledge of a client's expected
perjury protected as a privileged communication? The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility is not clear on this point.
The Model Rule on this subject, on the other hand, leaves little room
for question. Model Rule 3.3 prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence
that the lawyer "reasonably believes" to be false-except where consti-
tutional requirements in certain jurisdictions require that the lawyer
comply with a client's demand to offer false evidence. 143 Moreover, a
lawyer who discovers that evidence which has been presented is false is
required to "take reasonable remedial measures."
' 144
The reaction of the American Trial Lawyer's Association to the pred-
ecessor to this proposed Rule in the Discussion Draft of the Model
Rules was swift and certain. In the Introduction to ATLA's The Amer-
ican Lawyer's Code of Conduct, ATLA President Theodore I. Koskoff
wrote:
The basic precept of the Code is that American lawyers serve
clients, and that they serve the public interest by serving the interests
of their individual clients, one at a time ... In our secular age, the
lawyer's office is fast becoming the last confessional for the troubled
individual. As such, it is under attack from those who would make it
a listening post for the state, because they believe that the state must
know the truth, that the highest function of a system of justice is to
determine truth, and that all secrecy is inimical to truth.'
45
That, of course, is not really what Model Rule 3.3 says. The Model
Rule simply refuses to require the lawyer to participate in the client's
perjury under the guise of protecting the client's confidentiality. Confi-
dentiality from what? From having the judge suspect that the client
intends to pervert the legal system by lying? What right does any client
have to lie? To be sure, the lawyer may not disclose past perjury by the
client but to require the lawyer to aid in the perjury of his client be-
cause the client has some sort of "right" to mislead the court is sheer
perversion of the system and the law is very clear on this.
141. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS No. 155 (1936).
142. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1).
143. ABA MODEL RULE 3.3(c); Rule 3.3, caveat.
144. ABA MODEL RULE 3.3(c)(4).
145. ATLA CODE, supra note 113, at iii.
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For example, in dictum in Harris v. New York,146 the Supreme Court
of the United States said, "Every criminal defendant is privileged to
testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege can-
not be construed to include the right to commit perjury .... ,,t47 In
Harris the defendant had made a confession which the trial judge had
ruled inadmissible because of a lack of procedural safeguards required
by Miranda v. 4rizona. 48 But when the defendant took the stand in his
own defense later in the trial and proceeded to deny the facts he had
previously disclosed to the police in his inadmissible confession, the
court allowed the prosecution to use the inadmissible confession for
purposes of impeaching defendant's credibility. On appeal the United
States Supreme Court said, "Having voluntarily taken the stand, peti-
tioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately."'
149
Moreover, Harris was only one of a long line of cases in which the
United States Supreme Court has asserted that a defendant has a duty
to testify truthfully, or at least has no inherent right to perjure himself.
In Walder v. United States,' the Court said,
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest
opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to
deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving
leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence
illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case-in-
chief. Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting
the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance
on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility.
15 1
As Dean L. Ray Patterson said in a recent article in the Mercer Law
Review:'5 2 "Attorneys are nearing the point of recognizing that the es-
sence of the adversary system is an opportunity to be heard and to pres-
ent a claim, evidence, and argument to support the claim. It does not
necessarily entail the right to present a spurious claim, false evidence,
or irrelevant argument." Or, viewing the matter from the lawyer's
viewpoint, Dean Patterson wrote, "while the function of the lawyer is
to protect the client's interests, those interests do not include the right to
have the lawyer act as either an instrument or a shield of wrong
doing."'
153
One practical suggestion has emerged out of this controversy that,
146. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
147. Id at 225.
148. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
149. 401 U.S. at 225.
150. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
151. Id. at 65.
152. Patterson I, supra note 79, at 645.
153. Patterson I, supra note 79, at 646.
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given the proper effort by both parties to a lawsuit, has some possibili-
ties. Professor Norman Lefstein suggests that the attorney tell the cli-
ent at the very beginning of their relationship that the intent to testify
falsely is not a privileged communication.' 54 As Professor Lefstein ex-
plains it:
When a client tells the lawyer that he intends to commit perjury
after the lawyer has assured the client that all of his communications
are confidential, or after the client believes that they are confidential,
it is difficult to justify action which is tantamount to revealing to the
court the client's acknowledgement of guilt. . . Therefore, it is pref-
erable simply to inform the client, at the outset, of the specific scope
of the attorney-client privilege. If subsequently the defense attorney
. . . reveals the defendant's proposed perjury, at least the client will
not have been deceived into thinking that everything told to the law-
yer was confidential. 55
But regardless of the technique adopted by the lawyer to deal with a
client, there is simply no right on the part of the client to perjure him-
self and no duty ought to attach to the lawyer to aid in perjury. In
Model Rule 3.3 the ABA has at last recognized that fact.
PRO BONO PUBLICO SERVICE
Model Rule 6.1 provides that "a lawyer should render public interest
legal service." This duty can be discharged by providing professional
services at no fee or a reduced fee to individuals or groups or "by serv-
ice in activities for improving the law, the legal system, or the legal
profession."
In the Discussion Draft of the Model Rules this rule had required a
lawyer to render "unpaid public interest legal service." In discharging
this public service obligation, the lawyer could count only (1) activity
involving legal service to poor people, or (2) activity in programs
aimed at the improvement of law, the legal system or the legal profes-
sion. And while the Rule did not specify how much time a lawyer must
contribute, the lawyer was required to make an annual report concern-
ing this service "to appropriate regulatory authority."' 156
Response to this Rule in the Discussion Draft was, for the most part,
negative and resulted in proposed Rule 6.1, which is purely aspira-
tional. Presumably, Rule 6.1 will be acceptable to the NOBC. That
organization has said of the Discussion Draft version; "The intent be-
154. Lefstein, "The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury" Rethinking the Defense Law.
yer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 692 (1977-78).
155. Id
156. ABA MODEL RULE 8.1 (Discussion Draft).
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hind this rule is laudable. However, the goal sought should remain
aspirational and not be mandated."' 57
ONE-ON-ONE SOLICITATION
In another major change from the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity proposed Model Rule 7.3 would permit one-on-one solicitation.
158
The question of in-person solicitation is unfortunately caught in the
cross fire between In Re Primus,'59 in which the Supreme Court of the
United States held that one-on-one solicitation is protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution where the solicitation is
by a lawyer representing a non-profit organization that engages in liti-
gation as "a form of political expression" and "political association,"
and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assln. ,160 where the Court said that a
private practitioner who solicited a client in the hospital and at home
could be sanctioned for such solicitations.
Clearly, what the comment to the Discussion Draft of Model Rule
7.3 called "aggressive in-person solicitation by a lawyer seeking to gen-
erate a fee-paying case" may be prohibited by the state. But what
Primus and Ohralik leave unsettled is whether in-person solicitation
that does not involve coercion, harassment or misrepresentation, all of
which were involved in Ohralik, is constitutionally protected.
Mr. Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion to Primus and
Ohralik I" which focused on this gray area between the extremes of the
two cases. He emphasized that his concurrence in both opinions was
only because these two opinions dealt with cases at what he called "the
opposite poles of the problem of attorney solicitation,"'162 and sug-
gested that the First Amendment informational interests served by at-
torney solicitation of clients, that is of a nature which he called "benign
solicitation,"' 16 are "entitled to as much protection as the interests we
found to be protected in Bates."'164 Noting that blanket non-solicita-
tion rules discriminate against those potential clients who do not "move
in the relatively elite social and eduational circles in which knowledge
about legal problems, legal remedies and lawyers is widely shared," 1
65
157. NOBC REPORT, supra note 104, at 96.
158. The Chairman of the Legal Ethics Committee of the West Virginia State Bar described it
in his 1980 Report to the State Bar "what we have heretofore known as 'ambulance chasing'"
(copy on file at the Pacfic Law Journal).
159. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
160. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
161. Id. at 468.
162. Id at 471.
163. Id at 472.
164. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
165. 436 U.S. at 475.
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Justice Marshall suggested that "legitimate interests might well be
served by more specific and less restrictive rules than a total ban on
pecuniary solicitation."'1
66
Model Rule 7.3 seeks to strike a balance between Primus and
Ohralik and allows in-person solicitation (1) of close friends, relatives,
clients and former clients; (2) under the auspices of a public or charita-
ble legal services organization; and (3) under the auspices of a non-
profit organization "whose purposes include but are not limited to pro-
viding or recommending legal services," if the legal services are related
to the principal purpose of the organization. 67 On the other hand, a
lawyer is prohibited from initiating contact with a prospective client if:
(1) the lawyer should reasonably know that the "physical, emotional,
or mental state of the person solicited is such that the person could not
exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer," (2) the prospec-
tive client has "made known a desire not to receive communications
from the lawyer," or (3) "the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or
harassment."' 6 The rule seems, on close reading, to be carefully tai-
lored to the views expressed by Mr. Justice Marshall.
The necessity for clearly-drawn lines and precise guidelines is as
great in this area as in any in the modem practice of law. Model Rule
7.3 appears to be a reasonable solution to a problem that could no
longer be dealt with under rules designed for the practice of law in
rural America.
The legal profession's aversion to solicitation can be traced as far
back as Canon 16 of the Alabama Code of Ethics which read: "Special
solicitation of particular individuals to become clients ought to be
avoided." In 1908 the ABA adopted this principle as part of Canon 27,
though with somewhat different wording. 69 But the prohibition
against solicitation of clients, perfectly reasonable and even admirable
in its time, can no longer meet the needs of modem society as expressed
in Primus and Ohralik, and especially Mr. Justice Marshall's concur-
ring opinion to those two cases. The proposed Model Rule on in-per-
son solicitation appears to meet the demands of the time.
LAWYER'S DUTY TO KEEP CLIENT INFORMED
The lawyer's duty to keep the client informed is much more fully
166. Id at 476.
167. ABA MODEL RULE 7.3.
168. Id
169. "It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements,
through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal
relations."
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addressed in Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules than it was under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 7 ' Under the Code, only EC 9-2 addressed
this subject head-on and then only in one sentence. 17 1 Failure to keep
the client informed is a common cause of disagreements leading to eth-
ical complaints. Clients quite naturally tend to think of their matters as
the only business requiring a lawyer's attention. When they do not
hear from their lawyer they assume that the matter is being ignored.
By defining the extent a lawyer is required to keep the client informed
as that "reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation," Model Rule 1.4 may help alle-
viate this common source of complaints.
PROFESSIONAL COURTESY
Professional courtesy is a matter of no great moment but it should be
noted that the "professional courtesy" language of EC 2-18 which had
its roots in Canon 52 of the Alabama Code, is absent from the Model
Rules. EC 2-18 stated: "It is a commendable and longstanding tradi-
tion of the bar that special consideration is given in the fixing of any fee
for services rendered a brother lawyer or a member of his immediate
family." Its passing may suggest that the new Code, with its emphasis
on the modem "business" of practicing law, has no room for quaint
customs of the past.
ACQUIRING PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN A CASE
The suggestion of EC 5-7 and the injunction of DR 5-103 that a law-
yer should not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of his client or
otherwise become financially interested in the outcome of the litigation,
which was taken from ABA Canon 10, is also absent from the Model
Rules.
Moreover, Model Rule 1.8(e) now permits a lawyer to advance litiga-
tion costs172 with repayment being contingent on the outcome of the
matter.
170. Rule 1.4 COMMUNICATION
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about a matter by periodically
advising the client of its status and progress and by promptly complying with reasonable
requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain the legal and practical aspects of a matter and alternative
courses of action to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make in-
formed decisions regarding the representation.
171. "In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should
fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in a matter being held for the
client." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-2.
172. Such advancement of litigation costs is prohibited by DR 5-102(B) of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and ABA Canon 42.
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Thus two old bars to a lawyer becoming financially involved in his or
her client's case-bars based on the understanding of human nature
that a lawyer who "owns" a piece of the case may tend to lose objectiv-
ity-have gone by the boards.
Both Model Rule 2.1 and the comment thereto recognize the desira-
bility of independence of judgment free from concerns about disadvan-
tages to anyone other than the client. But the Model Rules cited above
seem designed to encourage lawyers to "buy into" cases and lose this
valued objectivity. Moreover, like fee-splitting, being able to advance
expenses to a client could lead to lawyers seeking out clients by the
offer to advance expenses. It seems a dangerous precedent and sound
justifications for the rule are hard to come by.
WHO IS THE "CLIENT9 "
Situations involving the representation of corporations or other
organizations often create confusion as to who is the client, the corpo-
ration or the persons who make up the corporation. Model Rule 1.13
clarifies the understanding of EC 5-18 that a lawyer retained by an
organization represents the organization and not the directors, officers,
employees, members, shareholders and other constituents. Moreover,
in dealing with those in authority in an organization and its employees,
a lawyer is required to explain the "identity of the client."' 73
The rule also outlines measures to be taken by a lawyer for an organ-
ization when the lawyer learns that a person associated with the organi-
zation is engaged in, or intends action or inaction that is a violation of
the law and which will likely result in significant harm to the
organization.
The care and detail with which this rule and its comment discusses
common problems of house counsel also reflects the Model Rules' con-
cern for lawyers who are engaged in other than traditional private
practice.
ETHICAL DUTIES OF SUPERVISORY AND SUBORDINATE LAWYERS
Model Rules 5.1 and 5.2 clearly set out the duties of subordinate and
supervisory lawyers under the disciplinary rules. These rules make it
clear that: (1) a supervisory lawyer has a duty to see that a lawyer over
whom he or she has supervisory authority conforms to the disciplinary
rule; (2) a subordinate lawyer has a duty to follow the disciplinary
rules notwithstanding the fact that the supervising lawyer orders other-
173. ABA MODEL RULE 1.13(d).
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wise. Neither of these matters was adequately covered in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The NOBC accepts both new Rules and
would include them in that organization's proposed "revision" of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
74
PRACTICE IN FIRM OWNED BY NON-LAWYER
Model Rule 5.4 permits practice in a firm owned by a non-lawyer, a
practice prohibited by DR 3-103 and ABA Canon 33 if the terms of the
relationship provide in writing that the lawyer will be free from inter-
ference with his or her professional judgment and the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct regarding advertising, fees and confidentiality are not
violated.'
75
The NOBC rejected a former version of this Rule, stating: "Inade-
quate justification has been provided for the significant change in the
delivery of legal services that this rule represents." 176 This is, of course,
a sharp departure from the former practice. The prohibition against
practicing law in a firm owned by a non-lawyer appears to be grounded
in the areas of advertising, 177 confidentiality 78 and conflict of
interest. 
79
Canon 2 and EC 2-11 express concern that a lawyer not practice
under a designation that could mislead lay persons. The concern of
Canon 4 appears to be that non-lawyers will be more likely to reveal
confidences and secrets of a lawyer. Canon 5 is more direct: DR 5-
107(C) simply forbids a lawyer to practice law for a profit in a profes-
sional corporation or association run to any extent by a non-lawyer.
The fear there, as expressed in old Canon 33, is that a non-lawyer may
be held out to be a practitioner of law or that a lawyer may find himself
under the direction of a non-lawyer who will replace the client as the
object of the lawyer's primary concern. These concerns appear, on re-
flection, to be archaic, self-inflating and ungrounded.
Curiously, DR 3-102, DR 3-103 and EC's 3-5, 3-6 and 3-8 permit a
lawyer to hire accountants and insurance specialists as "paralegals" in-
stead of making them full partners or working for them. It is curious
why this is currently the only acceptable way to proceed. Model Rule
5.4 is a reasonable change.
174. NOBC REPORT, supra note 104, at 9.
175. ABA MODEL RULE 5.4.
176. NOBC REPORT, supra note 104, at 93.
177. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 2.
178. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4.
179. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5.
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PRACTICE UNDER TRADE NAME
Model Rule 7.5, which permits a lawyer to practice under a trade
name, something prohibited by DR 2-102(B) is also a reasonable
change. 180 The present prohibition against the use of trade names is
grounded in the belief that a law firm's name should inform the public
with whom they are dealing, something that a "trade name" would not
do. But, in fact, a great many lawyers practice under firm names that
reflect only the identities of firm members long since retired or de-
ceased. If we are to allow a law firm to use a name containing deceased
members whose last names no longer appear among the list of lawyers
comprising the firm, then the rationale for not allowing lawyers to
practice under trade names does not hold up.
A trade name for a lawyer who wishes to use a descriptive term such
as "Main Street Law Office" is just as descriptive of who is practicing in
that firm as is the "trade name" of a law firm practicing under the
name of lawyers long since retired or deceased.
THE "REVOLVING DOOR" PROBLEM
Model Rule 1.11 expands on the requirement of DR 9-101(B): "A
lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he
had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee;" which
was itself largely a re-wording of old ABA Canon 36.181 Under the
Model rule, in addition to the former prohibition against representing a
private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer had been
substantially involved as a public officer or employee, the "revolving
door" problem is addressed from the viewpoint of a lawyer now in
public service. Moreover and directly to the heart of the "revolving
door" problem a lawyer in public service is prohibited from negotiating
for private employment with anyone involved in a matter in which the
lawyer is participating as a public officer or employee.'8 2
Model Rule 1.11 is a necessary rule which reflects the understanding
of the drafters of the Code that lawyers are no longer merely sole prac-
titioners engaged in litigation but perform many roles, in many facets
of the profession, including entering and leaving government service.
REDUCING FEE ARRANGEMENTS To WRITING
Model Rule 1.5(b) requires that fee arrangements be reduced to writ-
180. ABA MODEL RULE 7.5.
181. "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility while he was a public employee."
182. ABA MODEL RULE 1.1l(B)(2).
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ing except where the fee is implied by the fact that the lawyer's services
are of the same general kind as previously provided the client or the
services are rendered in an emergency.
At first blush this requirement strikes one as a purely "commercial"
or "business" approach to what has heretofore been a highly profes-
sional matter. Yet fee disputes are a common and frequent cause of
ethical complaints"8 3 and the prudent lawyer always makes certain that
clients understand how the fee will be arrived at and, if possible, what
the general range of the fee might be.
The NOBC report states:
Our experience in representing both integrated and voluntary bar
groups nationwide over many years has convinced us that fee dis-
putes constitute a major source of attorney-client disputes . . . Our
experience has also convinced us that a primary cause of fee disputes
is the absence of a clearly written document outlining the duties of
the parties to render services or to pay for them. It is clear that re-
duction of fee agreements to some form of writing is the single most
useful protection for the client and the lawyer. It is also clear that the
mandate to reduce the fee agreement to writing should apply to every
case and that the duty to produce the first proposal for the fee agree-
ment is appropriately that of the lawyer.
We agree with the Kutak Commission that the addition of a man-
date for a written, detailed, statement of the basis for a fee would
prevent numerous fee disputes and would also ease the resolution of
disputes between lawyer and client as to how much the client should
pay for the legal services of the lawyer.'
8 4
Model Rule 1.5(b) recognizes that the practice of law has many char-
acteristics of a business. That this is so is indisputable. Treating clients
in a fair, business-like fashion should not render a lawyer any less
professional.
The comment to Model Rule 1.5 lists "the client's ability to pay"
among the "relevant factors in determining the reasonableness of a
fee." Curiously, EC's 2-17 and 2-18 and DR 2-106, all of which deal
with setting fees, do not list the client's ability to pay as a factor to be
considered, although the subheading before EC 2-17 suggests it is to be
covered in one of the next seven EC's. Old Canon 12, "Fixing the
Amount of the Fee," did not mention the client's ability to pay as a
factor nor did any of the predecessor state codes. It is clearly time that
this factor, which certainly has to be one of the matters considered in
setting a fee, were made a part of the Code.
183. NOBC REPORT, supra note 104, at 26.
184. NOBC REPORT, supra note 104, at 26.
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CONCLUSION
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as a substitute for the
Code of Professional Responsibility, is neither as radical as its detrac-
tors fear nor as far reaching as its supporters would hope. But the pro-
posed Rules do represent a clear step forward in a multitude of ways:
First, the Code represents the first substantive revision of "law for law-
yers" in nearly a century. The 1908 ABA Code of Ethics set forth some
fundamental rules that represented the thinking of the profession at
that time as to what should be the fundamental conduct expected of
lawyers. That the code was haphazardly organized and mixed together
the mandatory with the aspirational should not detract from its impor-
tant role as a substantive statement of what was expected of lawyers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility, on the other hand, made a
clear distinction between the mandatory and the aspirational, but made
essentially no substantive changes in the lawyer's ethical code. Thus,
we find ourselves in the waning days of the 20th Century with an ethi-
cal Code that has its roots in Pre-World War I America. It is clearly
time for a change.
Second, the proposed Rules carry forward the basic belief underlying
the Code of Professional Responsibility that the ethical code binding
lawyers should not consist of merely polite suggestions about behavior
but should suggest a "ground floor" set of rules beneath which a lawyer
cannot function without facing sanctions.
Third, the organization of the proposed Rules is one with which law-
yers are already familiar and it is infinitely simpler and easier to under-
stand that the tri-partite organization of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Fourth, the organization of the proposed Rules according to the vari-
ous duties a lawyer performs is reasonable and reflects the day-to-day
world of modem law practice.
Fifth, the proposed Rules contain provisions that more clearly relate
to modem practice of law than the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity-in so many areas, in fact, that the mere revision of the present
Code would not suffice. Among these areas are the rules relating to
definition of a client, reducing a fee to writing, client solicitation, prac-
tice under a trade name, the duties of supervisory and subordinate law-
yers, and the "revolving door" problem.
Sixth, one of the most significant provisions in the proposed rules-
some would insist it is the most significant provision-the rule prohibit-
ing a lawyer to participate in or further a client's perjury-is one that is
mandated by the law and by concern for the integrity of our judicial
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system. For too long lawyers have played at the game of pretending
that the adversary system is an arena where conflicting facts and argu-
ments are thrown together, head-on, and somehow the "truth" emerges
from this process, without regard to any concern that the facts and ar-
guments that were fed into the system were true. The goal of the adver-
sary system is the discovery of the truth and not merely the victory of
one side or the other. A lawyer has a duty to that system not to pervert
it by concealing, rather than helping to reveal, the truth.
Seventh, and finally, the proposed rules reflect the thinking of the bar
after review of the Discussion Draft and contains numerous changes of
provisions that practicing lawyers found unacceptable in the Discus-
sion Draft.'85 These changes reflect the Kutak Commission's consistent
effort to provide a workable set of ethical rules.
The proposed rules will not satisfy everyone-a task which is impos-
sible. But the Model Rules represent a desirable improvement and de-
serve to be adopted.
185. Among those changes are the elimination of the mandatory pro bono rule, dropping the
requirement for an annual audit of clients funds, and "tightening up" of language in the rules
relating to client's perjury and client's confidentiality.
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